Expansion of nuclear power technology to new countries – SMRs, safety culture issues, and the need for an improved international safety regime by Budnitz, R.J. et al.
  
1       
 
ARTICLE FOR “ENERGY POLICY” JOURNAL 
 
TITLE 
Expansion of Nuclear Power Technology to New Countries – SMRs, Safety Culture Issues, 
and the Need for an Improved International Safety Regime 
 
AUTHOR #1 (Corresponding Author): 
Robert J. Budnitz  
AFFILIATION: 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
University of California  
Berkeley California 94720 USA 
Telephone: 1-510-527-9775 
Email: budnitz@pacbell.net  
 
AUTHOR #2: 
H-Holger Rogner 
AFFILIATION: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
2236 Laxenburg, Austria 
Email:  holger.rogner@gmail.com 
 
AUTHOR #3: 
Adnan Shihab-Eldin 
AFFILIATION: 
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences, Kuwait 
25253 Kuwait City, State of Kuwait 
Email: adnan.shihabeldin@gmail.com 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
o  Many countries currently without nuclear power plants are now considering their use.  
o  Many of these “newcomer” countries are considering new designs, including SMRs.  
o  SMRs now being developed offer potential advantages but also face many challenges.  
o  Deploying NPPs in newcomer countries depends on achieving a strong safety culture.  
o  Nuclear safety, a global concern, needs a strengthened international safety regime. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article reviews the status and prospects of nuclear power around the world and provides 
a perspective on the need to strengthen national and international safety regimes and bolster 
nuclear safety culture globally – one prerequisite for a sustained role of the technology in the 
future. It discusses the prospects in countries that have never deployed nuclear power before 
but have expressed an interest in adding it to their future national energy mixes. Many of 
these “newcomer” countries are considering small modular reactor (SMR) designs which 
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hold promise for fitting better into their local electricity systems. Thus, the article considers 
the technical attributes of these designs and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of 
SMRs with an emphasis on economics, grid compatibility and most importantly, safety. 
Attributes of a safety culture are discussed from social and cultural aspects, including topics 
of good governance and the presence of an independent national regulatory authority. Beyond 
the need for strong national safety regulations, the article also highlights the need to 
strengthen the international regulatory regime, if nuclear power is to succeed in achieving the 
highest levels of safety globally. Finally, the qualities of such a regime are discussed.  
KEYWORDS 
nuclear reactor safety; newcomer nuclear countries; small modular reactors; safety culture; 
international nuclear institutions 
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1. Introduction  
Two major international agreements of 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and the Paris Agreement, explicitly call for fundamental transformation of the world’s 
economies at unprecedented depth and speed. The energy system plays a key role in this 
transformation, in large part because several social, health and environmental ills are chiefly 
attributable to the current practices of energy demand and supply. Energy is the primary 
contributor to the emission of greenhouse gases causing global climate change, and energy 
system transformation holds the key to a more equitable, cleaner and more secure energy 
future (IEA, 2016). 
Nuclear power can be an integral part of the transformed energy system. On a life cycle basis, 
it is a low greenhouse-gas-emitting technology comparable to the best performing renewables 
and essentially does not emit pollutants responsible for poor local air quality and acidification 
(IEA, 2017; IPCC, 2011; Pehl et al., 2017). The high energy concentration per unit of mass of 
nuclear fuel means low fuel requirements per unit of electricity or heat, hence low waste 
volumes to be managed. Several years of fuel can be stored on-site contributing to energy 
security. Nuclear power is a baseload electricity generator, a feature very much needed in fast 
growing and industrializing countries. 
While the case for the expansion of nuclear energy in a carbon-constrained future is strong, if 
not compelling (IPCC, 2014; UNGA, 2015; UNFCCC, 2015), nuclear power continues to 
face problems in OECD countries due to several economic and socio-political factors. From 
an economic perspective, new nuclear power plants are expensive to build but generally 
inexpensive to operate with stable and predictable generating costs over extended periods of 
time (Forsberg et.al, 2017; Rogner, 2012; USNRC, 2017). However, the ‘bulkiness’ of the 
investment and the economic risks associated with it are no longer compatible with 
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competitive liberalized markets without government support. Construction delays and cost 
overruns have troubled the industry to the point of insolvency. The recent massive reduction 
in the cost of intermittent or variable renewable electricity generation combined with the 
externalization of the cost of their system integration narrows the economic space for new but 
also for existing nuclear power capacities. Cheap natural gas especially shale gas in North 
America and low-cost, high efficiency combined gas cycle technology is a better match to the 
variability of demand and variable renewable generation than base-load nuclear power plants. 
The emergence of low-cost natural gas liquefaction has turned gas into a much more global 
fuel than pipeline gas. In many OECD countries, low growth, and in some cases stagnation of 
electricity demand limit the need for capacity expansion, and capacity replacements tend to 
be of smaller unit sizes than their predecessors. In short, in the absence of a recognition and 
adequate compensation of several beneficial traits of nuclear power – from its 24/7 capacity 
availability (Bade, 2017) to its potential to mitigate climate change and other health and 
environmental benefits (EU, 2016) - the prospects of the technology remain restrained in the 
OECD. Neither the global climate accord (Paris Agreement) nor the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development mention nuclear energy (UNGAS 2015; UNFCCC, 2015).  
One of the compelling socio-political issues is public opposition and anti- nuclear politics, 
especially on the rise whenever there is a nuclear accident causing an incremental increase in 
the negative reaction among the public. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan 
resulted in a heightened safety concern regarding nuclear power, that has continued 
throughout several countries. The Republic of Korea is the latest OECD country to debate 
actively a policy of a nuclear phase-out following decisions to do so undertaken earlier by 
Germany, Switzerland and Belgium. Work on two reactors, about 30% complete, was 
suspended in July 2017 after President Moon Jae-in ordered a halt, but a government-
appointed panel recommended completion of the construction, although the panel’s majority 
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expressed support for a reduction of Korea’s reliance on nuclear energy (WNN, 2017a). 
Other countries (e.g., France, Sweden) have capped directly or indirectly the market share of 
nuclear power.  
However, the prospects for nuclear power remain bright in non-OECD countries, mainly in 
Asia, not only in countries that are already operating nuclear power plants (IAEA, 2017a), 
but also in more than two dozen so-called “newcomer” countries elsewhere around the world 
(IAEA, 2017b). Newcomer countries are countries that have never had an operational nuclear 
power plant but now have expressed interest in adding nuclear energy to their national 
electricity supply mixes. There is a wide spectrum of interest in these countries, from “simply 
exploring the issues” to “seriously preparing the introduction” of national nuclear power 
programs to “actually constructing” their first nuclear power plant(s), construction of which 
is underway now in four newcomer countries. 
The prospects for expansion of nuclear power plant (NPP) technology into countries that 
have no nuclear power plants today must be carefully assessed and planned, especially in 
relation to economic, social, and safety issues. The development and maintenance of a highly 
competent and independent national regulatory system, complemented and supported by a 
strengthened international nuclear safety regime, are very important in determining whether 
nuclear power can be successfully and safely deployed in such countries. Although achieving 
strong safety culture is of major importance in countries that already operate nuclear power 
plants, for newcomer countries achieving some of the needed safety attributes can often be 
difficult, especially if their importance is not adequately recognized throughout society and 
the political establishment. 
Small modular reactors (SMRs) have been advanced as new technical alternatives to the 
traditional large reactors, primarily because of their potential for significantly improved 
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safety performance, smaller unit sizes hence lower up-front capital requirements and 
affordability, grid considerations, and better match to demand and market uncertainty 
(Locatelli et.al, 2014; NNL, 2014; USDOE, 2018). While their initial deployment is likely to 
occur in countries with existing nuclear-power programs, these characteristics have made 
them also an attractive option for many of the “newcomer” countries, even though the 
commercial availability of SMRs in the world marketplace is still several years in the future.  
Thus, this paper discusses the role of newcomer countries within the nuclear landscape, their 
potential challenges, concentrating on nuclear safety issues, where by “safety” we mean the 
likelihood of an accident in a nuclear plant or nuclear fuel complex facility that would cause 
major damage to the facility with major releases of radioactivity offsite. Successful nuclear 
power programs have generally been cultivating and empowering highly qualified regulatory 
bodies as well as giving continuous attention to safety-culture issues. Safety-culture 
deficiencies have often been at the root of safety matters (Morrow et.al, 2014). The issue of 
nuclear security, either illicit acquisition of nuclear material or a malicious attack on a 
nuclear facility that would cause widespread damage and subsequent release of radioactive 
material that could pose an impact on either human health, the environment, or the economy, 
is also contemplated.  
Concerning the expansion of nuclear power in newcomer countries, this paper discusses the 
pros and cons associated with the use of SMRs as an alternative to full scale large NPPs. The 
advantages and disadvantages are discussed, and the attributes of the new SMR designs, 
including the advantages of proposed SMRs in terms of both economics and safety, are 
described and evaluated. The paper concludes by describing the attributes of a strong national 
safety culture with an emphasis on the need for a stronger international nuclear safety (and 
  
7       
 
security) regime. The importance of better appreciation of and response to the perception of 
safety risks amongst the public and decision makers is highlighted and described.  
2. Status of “Newcomer” countries  
Newcomer countries, interested in adding nuclear energy to their mix of national electrical 
supply, are starting to consider their options. In most cases, firm orders have yet to be placed, 
although negotiations are under way with one of the vendors around the world, while other 
countries have yet to reach even that stage. Table 1 provides a summary of the status of the 
nuclear power ambitions of newcomer countries. 
The status of the countries on this list is a moving target, reflecting changes in national 
nuclear policy.  For example, Vietnam at one point had decided to adopt nuclear power and 
was deeply engaged in negotiations with vendors but decided in the fall of 2016 to cancel its 
nuclear ambitions (at least for now) for economic reasons, and not because of technological 
considerations or safety concerns. The estimated capital costs had doubled since 2009, 
projections of electricity demand growth had halved, and public debt was about to spiral out 
of control (Nguyen, 2016). 
Another example is that of Kuwait, a major oil exporting country. Since the early 1970s, 
Kuwait has been actively planning the development of a national nuclear power program, 
especially during periods of high oil prices. Plans were suspended following the 1979 Three 
Mile Island accident and the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s. In 2009, there was a 
second serious attempt to resurrect the nuclear program (IAEA, 2016a). The Kuwait National 
Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC), established for this purpose, completed several 
feasibility, planning and site selection studies and entered into a number of bilateral 
agreements with several nuclear vendor countries. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 
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April 2011 led, almost immediately, to the cancellation of the national nuclear power 
program, once again. 
Table 1: Status of nuclear power programs of countries currently without operating nuclear 
power plants (Source: Authors’ assessment based on statements made by Member States at 
IAEA General Conferences and at other public forums; IAEA, 2017b and WNA, 2017). 
Country status Number Countries 
First NPP under 
construction 
4 Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey, United Arab Emirates 
First NPP ordered 0   
Decision made, 
preparing infrastructure 
5 Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Poland, Saudi Arabia 
Active preparation with 
no final decision 
9 
Ghana, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Sudan 
Considering nuclear 
power program 
12 
Albania, Algeria, Chile, Croatia, DR Congo, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia 
Note: Egypt is expected to join the category “First NPP ordered” in early 2018 and soon after the 
category “First NPP under construction”. On 11 December 2017, Egypt and Russia signed notices to 
proceed with the implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) of 2015 between the two 
countries for the construction of four NPPs at El Dabaa (WNN, 2017b). Table as of 14 April 2018. 
 
3. Reactors under construction 
About 450 reactors are now operating worldwide, most of them large light-water reactors 
(LWRs1). In countries that are currently building new reactors, almost all are large LWRs 
with a design similar to the vast majority of NPPs now operating worldwide. However, 
although all these large new LWRs incorporate modern features such as advanced control 
systems and improved metallurgy and fuel, some of them also incorporate advanced passive 
safety features that make the designs much more resistant to certain important classes of 
accidents (IAEA, 2015).  
                                                          
1 There are two varieties of LWRs operating today: Pressurized water reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors 
(BWR) 
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Most of the seventeen countries now building altogether 56 new reactors, as shown in 
Figure 1, already have one or more operating NPPs, but three of them, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
and the United Arab Emirates, do not (marked light grey).  
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Figure 1: Reactors under construction as of 14 April 2018 (Source: IAEA, 2018) 
 
Even though, as noted, the reactors now being marketed actively around the world are 
essentially all large LWRs, almost all the reactor designers/vendors worldwide are focused on 
developing so-called “advanced” reactors, which fall into three categories (GIF, 2016):  
i. Advanced large LWRs: with the claim of much improved safety achieved by taking 
advantage of passive features and other safety advances 
ii. Large reactors using a different (non-LWR) design 
iii. SMRs: smaller than conventional reactors  
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There is a renewed interest in SMRs in developed and developing countries alike, although 
for different reasons; the section below focuses on SMRs, their technologies, and their 
advantages and disadvantages generally.  
4. Small modular reactors  
The use of the word “small” usually denotes a reactor with an electric power level below a 
few hundred megawatts electric, although some proposed new SMR designs might be as 
small as 20 MWe. The term “modular” denotes a reactor design that could (or likely would) 
be deployed using numerous identical modules at a given site. The idea is to potentially 
deploy two or four SMR modules at a site, but in the more ambitious schemes, this could 
involve the deployment of eight to ten (or more) SMR modules at a site. The successive 
addition of multiple units at the same site would not only lower the capital cost per added unit 
relative to the previous unit, but also ease-over the finance requirements proportionally per 
unit.  
The technologies being developed range from small LWRs (using technologies that are in 
most features very similar to those used in today’s large LWRs) to advanced reactor 
technologies of many different types: fast-spectrum sodium or lead-cooled reactors, high-
temperature gas reactors, homogeneous-fuel reactors, liquid-salt-coolant reactors with pellet 
fuels, pebble-bed designs, fast-spectrum gas reactors, and a few others (IAEA, 2016b). While 
most SMRs are designed to generate electricity, a few aim to produce process heat for 
industry, and some aim to produce both heat and electricity. 
As of today, despite the nearly 40 different SMR design concepts being developed around the 
world, there are almost no SMRs being seriously offered for sale by the designers/vendors 
who are working on them. The first offers for an actual sale in the marketplace are still a few 
years off, although a few of the design companies might dispute the statement that they are 
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not yet for sale. The current roadblock, universally, is either that these designs are yet to 
demonstrate their ability to compete in the marketplace for electricity generation (and/or for 
process heat in a few cases) (NNL, 2014), or need regulatory approval, or both. 
However, around the world very few SMRs are now being built, and in each case as a 
prototype of what might be offered for sale more broadly sometime later (IAEA, 2016b). 
Among the SMRs now under construction are: 
 Argentina: a 27 MWe (megawatt-electric) water reactor (PWR) 
 China: a 105 MWe pebble-bed high-temperature gas reactor 
 Russia: a 70 MWe integral PWR being built for a cargo ship 
 Russia: a 50 MWe integral PWR being built for an icebreaker ship. 
A few other designers/vendors are currently planning to start construction on a prototype 
soon, but these decisions are typically in a state of flux pending regulatory approval, 
financing arrangements, and/or design maturity.  
5. Advantages to SMRs  
. 5.1 Economics 
The economics of nuclear power are largely characterized by high upfront capital costs but 
low, stable and predictable operating costs. The projected median investment costs of 
commercially available new nuclear builds have been reported at $4900 per kW installed 
(range $1800 to $6200) depending on technology and country (IEA/NEA, 2015). An 
advanced 1000 to 1600 MWe light water reactor, therefore, can command overnight 
construction (OC) costs2 between $5 to $8 billion (based on median specific costs) or more3 – 
                                                          
2 Overnight cost includes pre-construction (owner’s), construction (engineering, procurement and construction) 
and contingency costs, but not interest during construction (IDC) and cost escalation, e.g., inflation. 
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an investment volume that exceeds the capitalization capability of most utilities around the 
world. Such volumes of capital and associated risks usually cannot be shouldered by private 
sector entities without some support from the government.   
This capital-intensive nature of nuclear power is a major challenge for investors (Samadi, 
2017). The economic viability of capital-intensive projects is inherently sensitive to interest 
rates underlying their finance arrangements. These projects are also often characterized by 
significant technical complexity which can be a major cause of schedule delays and cost 
overruns4. Furthermore, interest during construction (IDC) is the second largest component 
(after OC costs) of the final investment costs of today’s new nuclear build. IDC accumulated 
over construction periods of more than five years can quickly lead to prohibitively steep 
financial burdens – not only due to the very nature of IDC but also because of the delay of 
initial revenue generation.  
The construction time of the Olkiluoto 3 NPP in Finland, the ‘first of a kind’ Areva EPR 
(1600 MW) was originally scheduled for five years with completion in 2009. However, 
construction delays postponed the plant’s start-up to May 2019 – a ten-year delay. The capital 
cost was initially put at €3.2 billion but now the overall cost is estimated at closer to €8.5 
billion. The two VC Summer Westinghouse AP 1000 units in South Carolina initially priced 
at $9 billion reached $14 billion in 2015 and were cancelled after the vendor Westinghouse 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (reportedly due to a loss of $6.1 billion on its 
AP1000 projects). In the fall 2017, the plant owners decided to shoulder a $9 billion loss 
rather than risk further delays and associated cost increases to possibly $18 billion. Note that 
South Carolina is a regulated market and the lion’s share of the loss will be recovered via rate 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Note: Some Asian countries report much lower costs for planned new nuclear builds, but it is not always clear 
what is included in these estimates. 
4 These delays and overruns are not uniquely a nuclear phenomenon but have been routinely observed in many 
non-nuclear but technically complex projects such as airports, railroads, harbors, opera houses, etc.  
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increases. Elsewhere (China, Korea, UAE), however, nuclear plants have been or will be 
completed on time and on schedule. Still, construction completion on time and on budget 
remains the single largest risk faced by NPP project sponsors, i.e., in terms of the uncertainty 
regarding the eventual investment costs followed by long payback periods of up to 20 years 
and more until they have recouped the initial investment. 
Nonetheless, recent experience in many non-OECD countries, including newcomers, paints a 
difference picture of NPPs being built at a relatively lower specific cost, on time and on 
budget. For example, construction of the first of four APR-1400 reactors at UAE’s Barakah 
site was recently completed (Cook, 2018). These are very large LWRs. According to publicly 
accessible information, a quasi-fixed-price arrangement with the vendor consortium for the 
four units amounts to $20.4 billion (i.e., less than $4000 per kWe). Although construction has 
proceeded on time and on budget, the issuance of an operating license for Unit I is taking a 
longer time than anticipated. This is attributed to the additional time needed for human 
resource development, team building, and training of a diverse staff recruited from over 20 
countries, clearly signifying the extremely high importance of the safety culture in the UAE 
nuclear power program.  
Historically, and still at present, the construction of all nuclear power plants operating today 
has had direct and/or indirect financial backing from the government. Direct financial 
backing has involved government ownership, as well as funding or other support 
mechanisms; indirect backing has been through NPPs being operated and financed in 
regulated electricity markets. These operations are characterized by rates regulated by 
government agencies on a ‘cost plus’ basis, which has essentially enabled operators to fully 
cover generating costs (including costs arising from construction delays and other operational 
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inefficiencies)5 at decreased risk. The risks of economic inefficiency such as cost overruns 
from plant completion delays in regulated markets have essentially been borne by the rate 
payer. In liberalized markets, competitive generating costs that turn a profit under often 
volatile market clearing prices rather than ‘cost plus’-derived rates determine revenue and 
economic success. Owners and operators in these markets face both volume and price 
uncertainty and all market risks rest with the investors.  
SMRs are expected to mitigate some of the key economic challenges associated with LRs. 
With an electricity generating capacity of typically below 300 MWe per unit, SMRs present a 
lower investment risk exposure to project sponsors compared to LRs. Despite the lower 
upfront capital cost per unit, for SMRs the specific investment costs per kWe installed are 
expected to be higher than for LRs, at least initially. This can result in substantially higher 
generating cost of electricity per kilowatt-hour compared with LRs (IAEA, 2016b). Expert 
judgments about projected early SMR generating costs display a wide range, from slightly 
below a new build LR to 50% higher or more (Abdulla et.al, 2013; NNL, 2014; SMR-Start, 
2017). Other SMR disadvantages in the short run have the potential to turn into comparative 
advantages in the longer-run (Rogner, 2009). These are set forth in the “box” (Figure 2) 
below. 
                                                          
5 Regulators would typically allow ‘plausible expenses’ plus a ‘fair return’ on the capital invested.  
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 High up-front capital costs 
 High level of complexity 
 Ex-ante cost uncertainty
 Completion risks: construction and supply chain risks
 Long lead times (engineering & construction, etc.)
 Long payback periods
 Sensitive to interest rates
 Reliability/availability/load factor
 Market risks (i.e. competitiveness of output, service; demand)
 Wavering political support
 Public acceptance
 Regulatory risks
 Energy/environmental policy risks
 Decommissioning and waste cost/liabilities
Expected 
comparative 
advantage of SMRs 
versus large reactors
 
Figure 2: Key challenges (risks) of nuclear power affecting overall nuclear economics. Source: 
Adapted from Rogner, 2009. 
 
Historically, the manufacturing or construction of many reactor components does not scale 
proportionally to size, which is the main reason why current commercial reactors have 
steadily become larger and larger. Although the economics of SMRs (capital costs, operation 
and maintenance costs and fuel costs) are not yet known, there are several factors that 
eventually may counter the economies of scale of LRs, mainly faster technology learning, 
standardization, shop fabrication and reduced levels of complexity of SMR designs.  
Figure 3 shows the historically observed tendency of increasing specific OC costs as plant 
unit sizes decrease (lack of economy of scale) when everything else remains equal. It then 
lists factors expected to offset the lack of economy of scale (in essence the MWh generated 
by LRs). Simpler plant designs allowing reduced number of structures, systems and 
components lower overall OC. Many integrated SMR designs can be shop fabricated and then 
transported as quasi complete modules to the sites for installation rather than constructed in 
the field. 
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Figure 3: Generic view of factors affecting comparative costs of small modular reactors (SMRs) 
and large reactors (LRs). Source: IAEA, 2013 
 
Modular and in-shop manufacturing not only enables standardization and manufacturing in 
series (spreading fixed costs over multiple units), and improves quality control, but most 
importantly shortens the time to market substantially and results in substantial cost savings. 
Shorter construction schedules lower financial charges that accrue without countervailing 
revenue and condense the exposure to cost escalation risks. The term ‘modular’ in SMR 
implies the erection of multiple units at the same site which through infrastructure sharing 
reduces costs.  
However, the most promising OC mitigation factor is a different form of economies of scale 
known as technology learning or learning by doing. Technology learning encapsulates the 
performance improvement of a technology as experience with it accumulates and is the result 
of both production and deployment. In nuclear terms, it represents the successive OC 
reduction unit by unit from the construction of a first-of-a-kind design to the construction of 
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the n-th unit of that design. Constructing LRs of 1000 MW capacity one at a time allows for 
less learning than the sequential manufacturing of five 200 MW SMRs.  
Assembly-line manufacturing of SMRs and fast learning-by-doing, the prerequisites for 
specific OC reductions to levels comparable with LRs, require the realization of a substantial 
market deployment. SMR vendors need assurances that there will be a sufficiently large 
market for their reactors in order to invest in manufacturing capacity, set up supply chains, 
fuel supply, human resource development and maintenance services (Lyman, 2013). The first 
wave of buyers, aware of the lack of competitiveness of their new plants versus LRs6, expect 
some kind of compensation for the extra risk they are assuming7. This constellation amounts 
to solving a nuclear chicken and egg problem which usually means the need for government 
funding or other government support. 
5.2 Finance 
SMRs will always have lower upfront capital requirements per unit than LRs. This means 
that the financial commitment necessary to begin building SMRs at a site is commensurately 
smaller and easier to finance (lower investors’ financial risk exposure compared with large 
unit sizes). Modular in-shop manufacturing and delivery of quasi complete units to sites 
reduce construction schedules and improve probability of on-time plant completion, hence 
minimize escalation charges and IDC. This approach also helps avoid the demand for ‘risk 
premiums’, e.g., higher returns on investments for equity finance and higher interest rates on 
debt finance often found in the finance of LRs. Thus, the successive addition of multiple units 
at the same site would not only lower the capital cost per added unit relative to the previous 
unit but also ease over proportionally unit finance requirements. Revenue generation from 
                                                          
6 Another potential risk faced by early movers is that they may have to compete against later buyers who reaped 
the benefits of the cost-buy down. 
7 The LR risk may not exist for SMRs in niche markets where large reactors would not be viable. 
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already completed units may also help finance the construction of subsequent units. 
Furthermore, realized revenue from existing modules can also help build investor confidence. 
5.3 Grid compatibility 
In industrialized countries, demand uncertainty, such as the prospects of slow rising or even 
declining electricity demand coupled with potentially significant changes in daily and 
seasonal demand load profiles, makes the expansion or simple replacement of LRs an 
economically risky proposition, especially in liberalized electricity markets. SMRs would 
substantially mitigate this risk (GIF, 2016). In many developing countries, the ability to 
absorb LRs onto the existing electrical grid is difficult, whereas SMRs can be more easily 
accommodated. Also, for many grids the occasional loss of a single LR unit from the grid 
would represent an unacceptably large perturbation on the grid itself, whereas the loss of a 
smaller unit would not be such a large problem. SMRs could also provide other services 
(besides electricity) including seawater desalination, hydrogen production, district heating, 
unconventional oil recovery, or high-temperature industrial applications.  
5.4  Safety 
There is a claim that SMRs are safer than the large LWRs, and for many of the designs this is 
transparently true. Although the reasons for improved safety vary and are not all shared by all 
the SMRs (GIF, 2016; IAEA, 2016b), a number of these features have been identified. For 
one, most of the smaller SMRs will have less thermal energy production per reactor 
(module), during operation and also after shutdown, from radioactivity remaining in the spent 
nuclear fuel. Therefore, they are easier to cool, especially following an accident and 
shutdown, reducing the risk of core meltdown and the potential release of radioactive 
material from the damaged NPP. Some of the SMRs rely entirely on passive approaches to 
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decay-heat removal and have a very extended time before overheating is an issue, providing 
an inherent stability and safety feature for these reactors.  
The design of most of these reactors is also simpler to understand, providing an enhanced 
operational efficiency. Some do not require electrical power to operate and are proposed to 
have better fuel consumption (including much longer intervals between refueling; in some 
cases, 20 or more years without refueling). A few of the SMR designs would never have 
spent fuel on-site, because an entire SMR core module after 20 (or more) years of operation 
would be removed from the site and replaced by a new SMR core module. Some of the SMRs 
are proposing to use liquid metals as coolants; thus, due to the high boiling point of these 
metals, some of the SMR pressure vessels operate at or near atmospheric pressure. Some 
SMR designs have much improved separation of systems and functions to reduce the 
likelihood of compromising multiple safety functions. Certain SMRs are designed for easier 
underground siting, increasing both cost effectiveness and providing superior levels of safety 
and physical security. Nevertheless, many SMRs would require a much smaller emergency-
planning zone (or none), because the radioactivity in the core is so much less, or the timing 
for any release would always be much longer than for a large LWR. 
Given this long list of potential advantages, the question that remains is what is delaying their 
deployment? In a nutshell, it is a classical chicken-and-egg situation. Due to lack of proven 
economics, as mentioned, there has not yet been enough market pull for SMRs. This has been 
compounded with an insufficient technology push, because of the absence of the necessary 
sales prospects needed to buy down costs (Pedraza, 2017). As noted, to be successful in the 
marketplace, any SMR needs to generate electricity at a cost that competes in the 
marketplace, considering all costs. Demonstrating economic competitiveness convincingly is 
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still for the future and will not be discussed further in his paper. Can shop fabrication and 
other proposed economies succeed? Nobody yet knows. 
6. Challenges facing SMRs 
Despite their many potential advantages, SMRs are still nuclear reactors and as such carry 
with them several common risks of nuclear-power technology. As with LRs, investments in 
SMRs are subject to regulatory risk, public sentiments and acceptance and changing energy 
policy. As well, SMRs share the same nuclear fuel cycle challenges. These exist at the back-
end with spent fuel management (including final disposal) and decommissioning, and include 
proliferation concerns throughout the fuel cycle, including at the front end, during operation, 
and at the back end. However, as mentioned earlier, some revolutionary-design SMRs would 
never have spent fuel on site (IAEA, 2016b), a clear advantage for some newcomer countries.  
On the other hand, the more revolutionary SMRs will need to pass lengthy pilot and 
demonstration-plant stages, requiring dedicated government support, without which these 
challenges would be even more difficult. Another challenge is how to adequately address the 
cross-border license, liability and regulatory issues: who regulates and who is liable.  
7. Importance of Safety Culture 
The nuclear-power industry and the national regulatory agencies with successful programs 
have studied the question of safety culture extensively over the years (IAEA, 2016c; INSAG, 
1991; NEA, 2016), because of its pertinent role in the operations and sustainability of nuclear 
programs. Several studies have identified the attributes of a weak safety culture for an 
individual NPP or a national nuclear-power program (INSAG, 1991; Morrow et al., 2014) in 
relation to operations, management and political environments. 
Traits of a weak safety culture include (INPO, 2013
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 a lack of rigorous operator training, and/or the inability of the operating crew 
members to improve their training (or indifference to this issue), 
 a broad absence of a “questioning attitude” concerning errors and problems when they 
arise,  
 a cultural environment that impedes the ability of any individual to raise safety (and 
security) concerns without fear of being ridiculed, ostracized, or retaliated against, 
 a weak or unstable political and social atmosphere in the country that prevents NPP 
management from taking steps as needed to improve safety, 
 a predominantly “top-down” NPP management approach that does not recognize the 
invaluable information coming “up from the bottom”, 
 a weak national nuclear regulatory agency and/or that lacks independence from the 
political echelon, and/or lacks sufficient resources to carry out its responsibilities, and 
 a broad culture characterized by widespread corruption in which financial payoffs, 
bribes, and similar activities impede the honest transactions of all kinds that allow 
safe activities to flourish. 
 
8. Achieving high levels of NPP safety 
Achieving and ensuring high levels of NPP safety involves meeting several different figures-
of-merit for NPP8 safety, but the most commonly used one today is the annual probability of 
a reactor core-damage accident, known as the core-damage frequency (CDF) (USNRC, 
2011). This is determined today using the well-tested analytical method known as PSA 
(probabilistic safety assessment) (ASME-ANS, 2009). The details of PSA and its results are 
beyond the scope of this short review, but the general conclusion is that, if one of today’s 
                                                          
8 In the following sections, the terms NPP and reactors are used interchangeably. 
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nuclear power plants is well designed and well operated, the CDF is in the range of a few x 
10-5 per year, and the probability of a large radioactive release is generally in the range of a 
few percent of CDF or around 10-6 per year (USNRC, 2015). Although there are wide 
variations from plant to plant, PSA studies of numerous NPPs around the world confirm this 
broad finding (IAEA, 2015). Furthermore, as a broad statement the national regulatory 
agencies around the world generally agree that a NPP reactor with a CDF in the above range 
is “acceptably safe” in that country. 
Of course, the advanced reactors now being designed, including the SMRs, generally promise 
a smaller CDF than the above, sometimes substantially smaller, as well as much smaller 
radioactive releases in the event of an accident, thus achieving higher safety levels. Some of 
the developers claim CDF reductions compared to large LWRs of an order of magnitude or 
more, and reductions in releases by even larger factors (IAEA, 2016b). These claims are 
backed up only by analysis, because of course none of these has yet been built, and also there 
has generally not been enough review by independent experts to validate these analyses, even 
though as a general matter many of them make good engineering sense. In the end, whether 
these will be achieved in practice awaits further developments. 
In order to achieve this high level of safety, the NPP must be well designed and well 
operated. In practice, there are a number of different ways to describe the appropriate 
attributes, but in brief, this would include that the NPP is well-designed and well-built and 
meets all applicable codes and standards (IAEA, 2006b). Furthermore, the NPP would have 
to be well-operated, ensuring that the operating crew, maintenance and engineering staff are 
well-trained. Information about problems and issues that are faced are shared widely 
(internationally). Most importantly, there must be a strong safety culture present on a national 
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level from all levels of society, top to bottom, including the presence of a national, strong, 
independent regulatory agency to oversee the activities of the NPP.  
Weaknesses in the skills and knowledge of the operating crew or of the plant’s maintenance 
and engineering staff, if they exist, or if a plant does not systematically take advantage of 
lessons-learned from problems occurring elsewhere, could obviously be a major reason why a 
plant may fail to achieve adequate safety levels and could lead to weaker safety performance. 
However, a broad consensus exists that, given a fully developed, qualified and robust national 
nuclear regulator, empowered to undertake its responsibility independently, a weak safety 
culture is typically the most important reason for poor overall safety performance (INSAG, 
1991; INSAG, 2006; NEA, 2016). 
9. Critical importance of safety culture for “newcomer” countries  
As in countries with established nuclear power programs, safety culture is the major concern 
for a newcomer country, if the country is to achieve adequate safety and security for the 
proposed new NPPs. Designing and building the NPPs correctly is an important aspect of 
establishing a sustainable nuclear program; however, all else being equal, achieving 
acceptable safety culture can be the vital make-or-break attribute of nuclear programs in 
newcomer countries. If a strong safety culture is absent, these plants cannot and will not be 
operated safely and securely.  
When establishing a safety culture, two different types of safety are considered. The first is 
the socio-cultural aspect of safety culture, which involves the organizational, communication 
and operational procedures that account for the cultural environment and collective 
preferences for certain values over others (e.g., reluctance to engage with supervisors on an 
emerging safety issue), including tribalistic versus pluralistic value systems. In short, this 
ensures that the cultural factors interact with the specific operational needs of an 
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organization. Furthermore, the culture must not be characterized by rampant 
bribery/corruption and must not be too “top down”. The culture must also be concerned with 
the safety of workers, encouraging a “questioning attitude”, to ensure that effectiveness and 
transparency exist across the operations.  
The second type is the political-cultural aspect of safety culture, which includes the support 
of political structures, such as the government and policy makers. It is of critical importance 
that the national safety regulatory agency be independent of politics. There must also be a 
long-term political commitment to the NPP program and national legislation committing to 
the main international conventions (IAEA, 2017c). An acceptably strong legal (contracts) 
system and court system should be present and there must be enduring continuity of the 
social and political institutions. If these attributes are present, there is a good chance that the 
NPP program can achieve acceptable safety. Without all these attributes, achieving an 
acceptable safety culture, on a national level, is unlikely. 
10. Strengthening the current International Nuclear Safety Regime 
The strength of a national safety culture must be complemented with the presence of an 
international safety regime, that addresses the global concern of nuclear safety (Rogner and 
Shihab-Eldin, 2017a; 2017b).  It is abundantly evident that the primary responsibility for the 
safety (and security) of any nuclear facility lies with the owner/operator of the facility, 
overseen by the governmental authorities within the country where the facility is established, 
licensed and operated. However, radiation releases from severe nuclear accidents do not 
respect jurisdictions or national borders; hence, there is the clear need for a robust and 
effective international nuclear safety regime. The regime should be composed of an 
interrelated 3-level hierarchy. At the core is a set of safety standards and guides, supported by 
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expert international support services and, if feasible, a higher level empowered international 
regulator, complementary to any national safety regime (e.g., national nuclear regulator).  
The establishment of the international Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in the mid-1990s 
was a major step forward (IAEA, 2006a). For now, it represents the vehicle for achieving the 
worldwide implementation of the Fundamental Safety Principles (FSP), which consist of 
three layers: Fundamentals, Standards, and Guides (IAEA, 2006b), and which represent an 
integral part of an effective Global Nuclear Safety regime. 
The CNS strives, amongst other things, to “achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear 
safety worldwide through enhancement of national measures and international cooperation.” 
Each country party to the CNS is required to take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety 
and security of the nuclear installations within its respective jurisdiction, and within the 
framework of its national law, including legislative, regulatory and administrative measures, 
as well as other steps necessary for the implementation of its obligations under this 
convention. Towards this end, the CNS requires Parties to submit, every three years, national 
reports on the implementation of their obligations, based on FSP, and status of compliance 
with the Article of the Convention for "peer review” by other Contracting Parties. The reports 
present evidence as to how Parties meet their obligations. Any actions identified during the 
peer review need to be addressed and are subject to review at the next convention meeting. 
The CNS also postulates that national implementation should be aided and thus strengthened 
by the inclusion of a variety of international institutions that engage in nuclear safety 
(INSAG, 2006). 
While the CNS offers a set of attractive incentives based on a common interest to achieve a 
high level of safety, it assigns the ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety to individual 
countries (IAEA, 2017c). This represents a serious shortfall and renders the CNS as a “quasi 
  
26       
 
voluntary” instrument without effective enforcement measures to ensure compliance such as 
imposing sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Unlike the comprehensive safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA that verify that non-nuclear weapon States party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty fulfil the non-proliferation commitment they have made, and non-
compliance can evoke international enforcement action via the UN Security Council, there is 
no [direct] mechanism of international enforcement of FSP or the CNS obligations. National 
political priorities and military or security interests prevent effective universal 
implementation.  
The way forward, in an ideal world, would be the establishment of an international regulator 
overseeing nuclear safety matters globally and empowered to take or call for enforcement 
action from a competent body. In the real world, because of escalating political 
fragmentation, both nationally and internationally, major international movement toward 
such an ideal situation is unlikely in the foreseeable future. A step-by-step approach is 
feasible, leading gradually to a stronger and legally more binding nuclear safety regime. 
Examples of such measures include the following:  
1. Make currently voluntary use of IAEA and OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency safety 
services9 quasi mandatory.  
2. Compile and maintain an up-to-date publicly accessible database with knowledge and 
information on nuclear safety, including CNS reviews and findings of safety review 
services, including country and OSART mission reports 
                                                          
9 Examples include but are not limited to the IAEA’s Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, 
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), Peer Review of Operational Safety Performance Experience 
(PROSPER), and Independent Safety Culture Self-Assessment (ISCA). 
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3. Create awareness and call attention to aspects of the nuclear safety regime that need 
urgent attention or improvement and determine what can be done to rectify the 
situation. 
4. Work towards building momentum among non-governmental organizations and the 
civil society to call for, and ultimately realize, a stronger nuclear safety regime. 
5. Encourage a closer involvement of the nuclear industry, such as the World Nuclear 
Association and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, with nuclear facilities. This also 
includes involving other international players, such as all the major nuclear power 
plant vendors worldwide. 
Experience has shown that in the short-to-medium term, it is unlikely that step-by-step 
enhancements presented above can be deliberated or negotiated at the boards and committees 
of the intergovernmental organizations engaged in matters of nuclear safety. While the 
context is not the same, examples do exist of successful processes of education, raising 
awareness, mobilization of public opinion and public pressure that has led to the realization 
of international agreements to regulate and mitigate other global risks from human activities 
that transcend national boundaries. Two such examples are the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the 2015 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change (with 195 signatories) which aims to reduce global 
greenhouse gas emissions and limit the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The success of these initiatives provides us the support 
and encouragement that the time for the consideration of similar grass-root efforts to enhance 
global nuclear safety is now10. 
                                                          
10 Nevertheless, the summer 2017 decision by the US President to withdraw from the Paris Agreement cautions 
against overoptimistic expectations of the effectiveness of Conventions. 
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11. The dynamics of risk perception 
Nuclear safety is a multifaceted composition of several factors (Rogner and Shihab-Eldin, 
2017b). As discussed earlier in the paper, these include functional aspects (such as plant 
design, manufacturing, construction and operation), regulatory aspects; socio-political aspects 
(such as political civil society acceptance, public tolerance, etc.), and economic aspects. 
Thus, a strong and sound nuclear safety culture embraces all the above aspects in an inclusive 
and inseparable holistic fabric with the ultimate objective of the full avoidance of 
catastrophic accidents (Budnitz, 2017). 
Another key aspect of a safety culture is the set of factors responsible for the perception of 
risk (from nuclear accidents) amongst the public and decision makers. These include 
voluntary vs. involuntary (i.e., degree of control over an activity involving risk), direct 
(positive and negative) experience vs. abstract events and metrics, immediate vs. delayed 
impacts (health, environment), chronic vs. catastrophic, degree of impact, knowledge within 
general public and experts (or lack thereof), technology change and specific risk performance 
(i.e., risk from flying), and perceived benefits or losses. We argue that a better understanding 
and appreciation of these factors would inform how to respond to the disparity that often 
exists between the public perception of risk and the engineering determination of risk and 
economics of risk mitigation in business practices. Furthermore, the public and experts assess 
these factors quite differently. Public perceptions of the risk factors can vary across countries 
and locations, and oftentimes might be influenced by their proximity to a nuclear source. 
With time, as new experience, knowledge or public information spreads (but also as 
memories fade), a shift in perception could occur, with a better understanding of the need and 
available alternatives. 
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An example in the shift in public perception of risk as a result of a nuclear accident can be 
seen in a nuclear energy survey-based study in China, which assessed the influence of the 
Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011 on the Chinese public’s attitude and acceptance 
of nuclear power plants in China. Two surveys, in terms of answers to four questions, before 
and after the accident, were administered to separate subsamples of residents near the 
Tianwan nuclear power plant in Lianyungang, China (Huang et.al., 2013). The findings of the 
study showed that the percent of opponents to nuclear power increased modestly between 6 to 
11 percentage points, whereas the support for the technology decreased more sharply 
between 23 to 36 percentage points (see answers to questions 1–3 in Figure 4). Huang et.al 
(2013) concluded “that previous supporters tended to sway toward more neutral opinions 
after the Fukushima accident, this shift was more common than the shift from neutral 
opinions to opposition. However, when asked whether they support construction of a nuclear 
power plant in their city, the percent of opponents increased markedly (41%), as seen in 
question 4”. 
Although China is not a newcomer country, the observed changes in risk perception and 
degree of acceptance of nuclear power amongst the Chinese public are attributed to the 
Fukushima accident. The study confirmed that the public’s perception of specific risk can 
vary over time and locations, and further confirmed that the accident “had significant impact 
on risk perception of the Chinese public immediately following the accident, especially on 
the factor of perceived risk, which increased from limited risk to great risk” and decreased 
public acceptance of nuclear power (Huang et.al., 2013).  
No doubt, given experience following earlier major accidents, e.g. Chernobyl in the USSR in 
1986, it is expected that the observed changes will weaken significantly over time (Bisconti, 
2017; NEA, 2010; NEA/OECD 2017). Experience to date suggests that short-to-medium term 
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effects are strong and tend to fade with time, but some cumulative residual effect from major 
nuclear accidents appears to persist. To ensure a more conducive environment for stable 
business and government decisions concerning the future role of nuclear power, at country 
level and globally, requires better appreciation and understanding of the forces and factors 
behind the perception of risks among the public and decision makers, in order to develop 
effective government and private-sector strategies and action plans. 
Newcomer countries have recognized the critical importance of keeping the public well 
informed, engaged, listened to, and involved. In the UAE, this is evident through their public 
engagement program, an integral part of its nuclear power program (ENEC,2015). The 
program is comprehensive and includes public forums and periodic public opinion surveys 
since 2011. This emphasizes that the public’s perception of risk and the overall public 
opinion does play an integral part in ensuring a strong safety culture and the sustainability of 
national nuclear initiatives.  
 
Figure 4: Effect of the Fukushima Daiichi accident on the risk perception of residents 
near a nuclear power plant in China. Results of surveys before (August 2008) and after 
(April 2011) the accident. Source: Adapted from Huang et.al., 2013.  
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12. Conclusions and policy implications  
From the above discussion, seven conclusions and their associated policy implications seem 
to emerge naturally. Some of the policy implications relate to technical issues, but many of 
them concentrate on institutions and policies or on the interface between institutional or 
policy issues and technical issues. 
i. Many countries around the world that have never deployed a nuclear-power plant (so-
called “newcomer” countries) are considering the deployment of large NPPs similar to 
those now in widespread use around the world, but others are considering small 
modular reactors (SMRs), where the term “modular” is intended to capture the idea that 
a typical deployment scheme might place several (5 or 10 or even more) of these 
smaller units on a given site instead of the one, two, or four large NPPs that would 
typically be deployed using today’s large-NPP technologies. 
ii. There are no SMRs currently in use, but nearly forty different designs are in active 
research-and-development around the world by companies and government agencies, 
and today four of these new SMR designs are actually being built as pilot plants: two in 
Russia, one in China, and one in Argentina. Other SMR pilot plants will probably 
follow soon. Whether these succeed in the marketplace, either worldwide or in some 
niche markets, will typically be determined by whether the economics will turn out 
favorably, something that remains to be determined. 
iii. The SMRs show great promise to enable the expansion of nuclear power in many 
electricity markets that are otherwise inaccessible to the larger LWRs. These smaller 
reactors are likely to be especially attractive in many developing countries, although not 
exclusively in them. Their potential advantages, which are not present for every design 
nor in every potential country, include lower per-unit capital costs, shorter construction 
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times, enhanced safety and reliability, and better integration into the electrical grid 
(especially if the grid is “weak”).  
iv. A key potential roadblock to the deployment of these new SMR designs, besides the 
financial issues already mentioned, is the ability of individual national regulatory 
authorities to review the SMR designs and approve them. The process to obtain 
regulatory approval has only recently begun in a few of the advanced countries and will 
require a few years to mature. There will be a need to address a new set of issues 
related to cross border license, liability and regulatory challenges. Another key 
potential roadblock is the need, in the case of revolutionary-design SMRs, for lengthy 
and costly pilot and demonstration stages, requiring strong government involvement, 
commitment and financial support. 
v. Also, some of the “newcomer” countries have advanced technological capabilities and 
infrastructure, others do not. Even where these capabilities and infrastructure exist (but 
even more so where they do not), a major barrier to widespread deployment of nuclear 
power in some of these “newcomer” countries is the absence of a strong safety culture, 
comprised of a set of social and political issues that includes corruption culture, the 
culture of institutional continuity and integrity, and other good-governance matters. 
Policies that emphasize the positive attributes of these cultural issues, or discourage 
their opposite, are an urgent matter.  
vi. The need for an independent regulatory agency with authority and independence from 
politics cannot be overemphasized. No country without this should deploy nuclear-
power technology. Policies to provide assistance and mentoring are a vital component 
  
33       
 
vii. A serious nuclear accident anywhere is of a concern everywhere worldwide. There is 
therefore a need to strengthen the international safety regime. Ideally the aim is to set 
up an empowered international regulator, which may be the IAEA. A gradual 
approach would involve, where feasible, making some current advisory services of 
the IAEA mandatory. Many reasons stand in the way of reaching quick agreement 
amongst governments towards this needed outcome. A gradual approach, comprised 
of sustained and structured programs and campaigns, is thus needed. It would include 
well supported research and education activities aiming to raise awareness amongst 
the public, the political decision makers, the entities that operate the nuclear power 
plants, and the regulatory agencies.  
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Table 1 
Status of nuclear power programs of countries currently without operating nuclear 
power plants (Source: Authors’ assessment based on statements made by Member 
States at IAEA General Conferences and at other public forums; IAEA 2017b and 
WNA 2017) 
 
Country status Number Countries 
First NPP under 
construction 
4 Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey, United Arab Emirates 
First NPP ordered 0   
Decision made, 
preparing infrastructure 
5 Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Poland, Saudi Arabia 
Active preparation with 
no final decision 
9 
Ghana, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Sudan 
Considering nuclear 
power program 
12 
Albania, Algeria, Chile, Croatia, DR Congo, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia 
Note: Egypt is expected to join the category “First NPP ordered” in early 2018 and soon after 
the category “First NPP under construction”. On 11 December 2017, Egypt and Russia 
signed notices to proceed with the implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA) of 2015 between the two countries for the construction of four NPPs at El Dabaa 
(WNN, 2017b). Table as of 14 April 2018. 
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Figure 1 
Reactors under construction as of 14 April 2018 (Source: IAEA, 2018) 
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Figure 2 
Key challenges (risks) of nuclear power affecting overall nuclear economics. Source: 
Adapted from Rogner, 2009. 
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Figure 3 
Generic view of factors affecting comparative costs of small modular reactors (SMRs) 
and large reactors (LRs). Source: IAEA 2013 
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Figure 4 
Effect of the Fukushima Daiichi accident on the risk perception of residents near a 
nuclear power plant in China. Results of surveys before (August 2008) and after (April 
2011) the accident. Source: Adapted from Huang et.al, 2013.  
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